Brazil and China have emerged as two key actors of the Global South and South-South cooperation, notably in the realm of the BRICS and BASIC. Since the beginning of the 2000s, both states have endeavored to play an influential role in the sphere of international politics, security, and trade, with the reconfiguration of global governance in view. Literature has mostly focused on the economics of Brazil-China strategic partnership and their engagement in South-South cooperation. This chapter aims at expanding the knowledge on this bilateral partnership by exploring its most recent developments stemming from Lula da Silva’s undertakings to resume Brazil’s strategic cooperation with China, as part of a foreign policy revocation (revogaço) strategy, after the stress test posed to such relationship by Jair Bolsonaro’s foreign policy. It argues that although the revogaço-oriented efforts have put the Brazil-China relations back on track, they have revealed a cherry-picking approach since they have fallen short of the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with China. This chapter concludes that self-exclusion from the BRI, besides mirroring political domestic calculations imposed by highly polarised politics and society, has evinced Brazilian authorities’ perception of its instrumental twofold symbolic nature. On the one hand, it embodied a politico-strategic symbolism, conveying Brazilian preference for nonalignment, a status that ascribes the country indispensable room of manoeuvre to articulate and bargain simultaneously with major players. On the other hand, the signing of a BRI MoU with China was seen as a rhetorical act, bringing about limited additional benefits, compared to those springing from a revitalised strategic partnership.