The gradual return of a “Cold War logic” in the international system, in which privileged economic ties with friends are favored to the detriment of economic interest, gives new contours to the debate about the future of the International Monetary and Financial System (IMFS) and, more specifically, to the role reserved to China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB). For some analysts, given the economic and political capabilities of China, the rise of the RMB as a relevant international currency would be only a matter of time. However, up until now, a great asymmetry prevails between China’s economic and political weight and the international use of its currency. While the RMB has experienced rapid progress in its internationalisation process, its international status is still insignificant to challenge the dominant role of the dollar. While Brazil has openly advocated for an IMFS less centred on the US dollar, it has never endorsed a system dominated by the RMB. Amid the evolving “New Cold War” dynamics, Brazil positions itself as a nonaligned nation, pursuing a foreign policy centred on independence, balance, and multipolarity. However, this multi-alignment strategy unfolds within the broader context of great-power politics, where both the United States and China exert considerable influence over Brazil. Building on previous efforts that look on how foreign states have reacted to the international rise of the RMB, this chapter examines the extent to which Brazil has, intentionally or inadvertently, supported China’s efforts to establish the RMB as a global currency. Assuming that RMB’s growing internationalisation will boost China’s power significantly, as stressed by the political economy literature on international currencies, thus implying a redistribution of global power, this chapter investigates the position of Brazil in three areas: (i) trade; (ii) foreign direct investment (FDI); and (iii) international reserves, bilateral currency swap arrangements, and institutional policies. This analysis examines Brazil’s bilateral relations with China in comparison with its relations with the United States, aiming to pinpoint Brazil’s position within the rivalry between these two major powers in the monetary and financial areas. The analysis of this chapter suggests that while Brazil is not actively championing the RMB as a global currency, its actions—such as including RMB in its reserves and engaging in trade discussions—reflect a pragmatic willingness to adapt to shifting global dynamics.