In the context of concentrated dual channels, manufacturers do not open their own online direct sales channels, but sell their products wholesale to a retailer that has both online stores and offline physical stores for distribution. At this time, traditional retail channels and online sales channels are considered to be two business units centrally controlled by dual-channel retailers. Under this channel structure, since both online and offline channels belong to the same retailer, the phenomenon of consumer showrooming is alleviated compared with decentralized dual channels, and can be coordinated and controlled to a certain extent. This part studies the impact of service spillover and power structure on O2O dual-channel supply chains. This chapter explores the optimal pricing decision of the supply chain under three different power structures, and examines the impact of service spillover and power structure on pricing, demand and revenue of the supply chain. The study shows that under the three power structures, the enhancement of service spillover is always beneficial to the manufacturer’s revenue; unlike decentralized dual channels, in concentrated dual channels, service spillover does not necessarily lead to dual channel price competition; under the three different power structures, the intensity of service spillover has a significant impact on the retailer’s revenue and service strategy. When the manufacturer is the leader in the Stackelberg game model, the impact of spillover intensity on the retailer’s revenue depends on consumers’ acceptance of online channels and service levels. At this time, the adoption of a service differentiation strategy can improve the revenue level of O2O retailers under certain circumstances. When the manufacturer and the retailer are in Nash equilibrium, the retailer’s revenue is positively correlated with the service spillover intensity. At this time, the retailer can adopt a service consistency strategy to increase profits. When the retailer is the leader in the Stackelberg game model, the retailer’s revenue first decreases and then increases with the service spillover intensity. In this scenario, retailers can adopt a mixed service strategy to reduce revenue losses.