Member-Driven Principle and Its Role in WTO Decision-Making
摘要
This chapter examines the “member-driven” principle as a foundational characteristic of the WTO’s institutional design and its operational relationship with consensus-based decision-making. Denoting a governance structure where collective decisions are taken by Member governments rather than delegated to an independent institutional authority, this principle has historical continuity from the “collective parties-driven” practice of the GATT 1947 era. It has evolved into a constitutional norm that preserves Members’ autonomy, equality and broad-based legitimacy across both political and technical levels of deliberation. Functionally, the member-driven and consensus principles reinforce each other: while the former emphasizes the collective role of the membership in steering the agenda, the latter highlights the individual position of each Member, ensuring that no decision is adopted if any Member formally objects. However, an overly rigid interpretation can lead to fragmented decision-making, where Members pursue individual preferences at the expense of unity, and counterproductively constrains key institutional assets—such as the Director-General’s political leadership, the Secretariat’s professsional support and negotiation chairs’ facilitative functions. To break this impasse, a balanced approach must treat member-driven governance not as an obstacle to efficiency, but as a framework that enables effective decision-making through reasonable flexibility and institutional awareness. Efficiency is enhanced when all configurations of meetings—formal or informal—are recognized as operating within this framework, and when Members avoid repeatedly restating well-known positions, relying instead on previously recorded views or consolidated summaries to focus effort entirely on identifying shared solutions.