State-owned Assets Management and SOE Governance Reform: CCP Control Is Looming Again
摘要
The significant number of Chinese SOEs and their growing international presence have raised concerns about the extent of political control over modern SOEs. This chapter offers a comprehensive analysis of the evolving governance framework of Chinese SOEs, with a particular focus on the increasing integration of political oversight into the legal structure governing SOEs. By examining recent reforms and legislative developments, this chapter highlights how China’s governance model diverges from internationally recognized corporate governance standards by embedding Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authority within SOE governance frameworks. It provides a detailed analysis of the intersection between political authority and corporate governance, emphasizing the role of CCP leadership as enshrined in the amended Company Law and related reforms. The study reveals a strategic shift in the Chinese government’s approach to SOE oversight, moving from centralised control to a governance model characterised by decentralized supervision and the introduction of conceptually ambiguous institutional entities such as State-owned Capital Investment and Operation Companies. The findings offer critical insights into the institutional mechanisms shaping SOE decision-making and international expansion, underscoring the global significance of Chinese SOE reforms and their role in shaping international economic governance.