Executive Accountability

The ability of people to fulfil their role as citizens depends on their being able to obtain information relating to the government’s performance so as to hold it to account. One way in which these objectives are served is by parliament acting on behalf of voters and using the powers it has under the doctrine of responsible government to inquire into the conduct of the executive and to express lack of confidence in ministers. However these powers are less effective in practice than they are in theory. One reason for this is that the doctrine of parliamentary privilege, specifically Article 9 of the Bill of Rights Act of 1689, which has widely been adopted throughout the Commonwealth and which denies the courts jurisdiction to inquire into parliamentary proceedings. This means that no recourse is available in instances where members of the executive either refuse to attend parliamentary committees that are seeking to question them or, even if they do attend, refuse to answer questions. In addition, the ability of parliamentary committees to initiate contempt proceedings in such circumstances is circumscribed by the fact that such proceedings must be initiated by parliament as a whole where, by definition, the government has a majority. This also makes it virtually impossible for an adverse finding relating to a minister’s performance to lead to a vote of no confidence. This chapter argues that the law should be reformed in such a way as to make it an offence to refuse to attend a parliamentary committee or to give evidence to it, giving the courts the jurisdiction to hear such cases and conferring standing on individual committee members to initiate proceedings. This would overcome the problem of governmental control over contempt process and would ensure that citizens have access to the information they need to make informed decisions.