This chapter examines how injustice operates at the level of knowledge and credibility by extending Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice through postcolonial and feminist scholarship. It argues that liberal political frameworks systematically disqualify subaltern testimony by framing it as irrational, excessive, or unintelligible, thereby regulating not only what can be said but who can be heard. Rather than treating subaltern narratives as supplementary evidence, the chapter reads Dalit autobiographical writing and Indigenous land-based struggles as sites of theoretical production that challenge dominant epistemic norms. It introduces epistemic refusal as a methodological stance that resists the liberal demand for translation into recognisable idioms of reason, neutrality, or civility. By foregrounding refusal, the chapter shifts attention from inclusion within existing frameworks to the politics of voice itself, showing how epistemic injustice functions as a constitutive dimension of structural domination rather than a secondary harm.