Young People, Elections, and the Epistemic Value of Democracy

Below a certain age, citizens are excluded from the right to vote. This is the way it is, and this is the way that most people, both in democratic theory and the general public, think it should be. The standard justification for the voting age holds that young people lack the relevant competence or knowledge required to participate in elections. This chapter argues that this justification fails. First, it shows that this widely accepted view is based on an epistemic conception of democracy according to which the value of democratic procedures rests at least partly on their capacity to yield “correct” outcomes. This conception is controversial but will be accepted for the sake of argument. The chapter then moves on to show that even then, the standard justification for the voting age does not succeed. There are two arguments for this: according to a modest argument, it is implausible to assume that the enfranchisement of young people would undermine the epistemic value of democracy; according to a more ambitious argument, there is even good reason to believe that the enfranchisement of young people will enhance the epistemic value of democracy. If either of these arguments is correct, the widespread rationale behind the voting age is mistaken. We therefore need to ask anew what the purpose of the voting age is, and whether it is a suitable means to that end.