This chapter examines the challenge that dual use poses to the verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). It begins by reviewing the categorization proposed by Vaynman and Volpe that divides the dual use information sharing problem into four categories based on high and low distinguishable technologies and high and low integration of civil and military technologies. The characteristics of biotechnology put the prospects for an agreement on BWC verification into what they call the “dead zone”. The chapter then analyses past efforts to deal with the lack of BWC verification measures by development of Confidence Building Measures and a legally binding protocol. The complications caused by rapid advances in a number of relevant science and technologies fields and the increased importance of biodefence are then reviewed before the prospects for agreement in the current discussions amongst states parties are assessed. The chapter concludes that in the present international situation agreement is unlikely and therefore other methods of dealing with the challenge are required. It is suggested that behavioral arms control presents one such opportunity. This framework could allow the increase of the distinguishability of technologies in the ‘dead zone’ by much less formal means than traditional treaty-based verification measures. The chapter further concludes that demonstrating responsible conduct as well as biosecurity awareness-raising measures and education for life and associated scientists could be combined with increased state regulation of potentially dangerous research following the pandemic.