Rendulic and the Military Necessity Defence in Hostage: Did He Speak the Truth?

This chapter starts with General Lothar Rendulic’s contemporaneous view of possible Western Allied and Soviet operations against the 20th Mountain Army during its retreat from positions in the Litsa sector and others in Northern Russia and those in Northern Finland and, from November 1944, Eastern Finnmark. The chapter compares the German threat perceptions about their enemies’ intentions to Soviet and Western Allied planning as it actually developed. When Rendulic claimed before the tribunal that he saw Soviet and/or Western attacks in Northern Norway at the time as not only possible or even likely, but also as a major threat to his Army, was he telling the truth? As regards the Allies, the chapter focusses on the planning and operations of the Red Army’s Karelian Front that culminated in the 14th Army offensive on the Murmansk sector in October-November. What were the Soviet intentions after the offensive came to a halt in early November? The chapter also summarises the Western Allies’ thinking about landing operations in Norway during the same period. The chapter’s main conclusion is that Rendulic’s courtroom version of his thinking from autumn 1944 to early 1945 about possible Western Allied or Soviet operations in Northern Norway largely corresponds to his contemporaneous thinking as it can be reconstructed from German archival sources. We know in hindsight that his evaluation of Western Allied and Soviet thinking was wrong, but there was nothing unreasonable in his expectation that the Western Allies or the Soviets would launch operations against his retreating Army.