The End of (Nuclear) History Revisited: Could Russia Break the Nuclear Taboo?

The Cold War storytellers does not often refer to that era as of a period of superpowers cooperation, but like a nuclear competition. And actually, they are not entirely wrong. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the nuclear race between the United States and the Soviet Union became the paramount of the Cold War era. The invention of nuclear weapons ushered in a revolution in international politics and particularly in the way that states think about and plan for war. Since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has conducted an intense campaign of nuclear signaling and threats designed to provide it with a strategic advantage. Whatever Russia’s nuclear strategy is, Russian officials have made many statements about nuclear weapons that appear to go beyond the published doctrine, threatening to potentially use them in situations that do not meet the conditions described. In this context, the question arises how worried should we be? Through nuclear insinuations, the Kremlin appears to reinforce three goals: drawing a clear red line against NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine, to climb the escalation ladder so, when the tipping point is reached, the West might accept the idea of some negotiations. The dynamic behind escalation is provided by either the tit-for-tat mentality and the bizarre game of nuclear look-at-me, which means that if one side ups the ante, the other is sure to follow, or the kind of miscalculation or chance occurrence common in war. So far, the 79-year-old taboo against the use of nuclear weapons has held, but the world cannot take it for granted. To preserve and strengthen the consensus against nuclear weapons use and threats of use, we must sustain pressure against those who might try to break the nuclear taboo.