Skeptical psychiatry puts doubt on common and deeply engrained psychiatric beliefs. These critical voices have usually been combined, often disapprovingly, under the label antipsychiatry. This chapter introduces the arguments of skeptical psychiatry along six lines of thought: First, the idea of the social construction of mental illness will be explored. It will be shown that constructionist arguments do not undermine the validity of psychiatric classifications. Second, the skeptical opposition to the medical model of mental pathology will be explained. Third, a common argument of skeptics is to contrast mental illness and somatic disease to undermine the cogency of the concept of mental pathology. This argument will be explained in the context of the philosophical mind-body problem, and it will be shown why it fails. Fourth, some skeptics retell the history of psychiatry. The purpose is to open alternative viewpoints on an alleged story of success and to make explicit concealed developments. Fifth, skeptical psychiatry has identified social control and exclusion as functions of psychiatry and thereby challenged the almost exclusive focus on therapeutic and humanistic functions. Sixth, many authors, as well as interest groups, have made strides to reassess madness. The purpose is to attack the common negative evaluation of mental affliction as something necessarily bad. Altogether, although some arguments of skeptical psychiatry are not convincing, the overarching effect of providing unorthodox viewpoints is to make valuable contributions to the theoretical and practical advancement of psychiatry.

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Skeptical Psychiatry: Critical Approaches to Mental Illness

  • Thomas Schramme

摘要

Skeptical psychiatry puts doubt on common and deeply engrained psychiatric beliefs. These critical voices have usually been combined, often disapprovingly, under the label antipsychiatry. This chapter introduces the arguments of skeptical psychiatry along six lines of thought: First, the idea of the social construction of mental illness will be explored. It will be shown that constructionist arguments do not undermine the validity of psychiatric classifications. Second, the skeptical opposition to the medical model of mental pathology will be explained. Third, a common argument of skeptics is to contrast mental illness and somatic disease to undermine the cogency of the concept of mental pathology. This argument will be explained in the context of the philosophical mind-body problem, and it will be shown why it fails. Fourth, some skeptics retell the history of psychiatry. The purpose is to open alternative viewpoints on an alleged story of success and to make explicit concealed developments. Fifth, skeptical psychiatry has identified social control and exclusion as functions of psychiatry and thereby challenged the almost exclusive focus on therapeutic and humanistic functions. Sixth, many authors, as well as interest groups, have made strides to reassess madness. The purpose is to attack the common negative evaluation of mental affliction as something necessarily bad. Altogether, although some arguments of skeptical psychiatry are not convincing, the overarching effect of providing unorthodox viewpoints is to make valuable contributions to the theoretical and practical advancement of psychiatry.