Aristotle defines truth as the correspondence of thought with reality. He distinguishes between first philosophy (metaphysics), which deals with the fundamental principles of being, and second philosophy (physics), which addresses the concrete nature of things. Metaphysics thus aims to determine reality with the help of universally valid logical principles such as the law of non-contradiction and the doctrine of substance. In this context, he regards substance (ousia) as the underlying entity that makes the existence of everything else possible. For Aristotle, ousia is what gives a thing its identity and what exists independently of other things. This concept stands in contrast to Platonic Ideas, since Aristotle does not view ousia as an abstract idea but as a concrete reality that exists within individual things themselves. In light of this, he discusses whether truth is merely a property of products of the mind or whether it exists independently of our thinking, arguing that truth primarily lies in the “being-so” of things themselves, independent of human thoughts or statements. This leads to two main problems: 1. How can something universal be the defining essential feature of the concrete and real? 2. Is the distinction between substance and accident a feature of reality or of our language? These questions will shape later discussions of the correspondence theory of truth, as they examine the relationship between reality and our linguistic capacities. A central problem of his doctrine of substance is how the universal can determine the concrete, whereby he argues that the eidos (form) is immanent in individual things. Analytic philosophy offers alternatives to Aristotle’s concept of substance, including Locke’s substratum theory, which sees substance as an unknowable bearer of properties, and the bundle theory, which states that a thing is merely the sum of its properties. However, these alternatives encounter problems regarding the identity of things with identical properties, as illustrated by the example of the “Ship of Theseus.” Heidegger, by contrast, emphasizes that being and beings are inseparable and that language functions only through generalization, which leads to an internal contradiction when the concrete and individual are to be grasped. Aristotle’s concept of truth thus first raises the question of the identity of thought and being. The concept of substance and the question of truth prove to be closely intertwined in this context, insofar as both concepts aim at the foundation of ALL things and at the same time conceptualize the existence of each thing as based on an individual substance that makes it what it is. Aristotle’s concept of substance already shows that every concept of reality (to which we wish to ascribe truth) is the result of a process of judgment that is based on the (not truly verifiable) assumption of the identity of being and thought.

Aristotle

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2026年

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Tino Schmidt,
Matthias Schmidt

摘要

Aristotle defines truth as the correspondence of thought with reality. He distinguishes between first philosophy (metaphysics), which deals with the fundamental principles of being, and second philosophy (physics), which addresses the concrete nature of things. Metaphysics thus aims to determine reality with the help of universally valid logical principles such as the law of non-contradiction and the doctrine of substance. In this context, he regards substance (ousia) as the underlying entity that makes the existence of everything else possible. For Aristotle, ousia is what gives a thing its identity and what exists independently of other things. This concept stands in contrast to Platonic Ideas, since Aristotle does not view ousia as an abstract idea but as a concrete reality that exists within individual things themselves. In light of this, he discusses whether truth is merely a property of products of the mind or whether it exists independently of our thinking, arguing that truth primarily lies in the “being-so” of things themselves, independent of human thoughts or statements. This leads to two main problems: 1. How can something universal be the defining essential feature of the concrete and real? 2. Is the distinction between substance and accident a feature of reality or of our language? These questions will shape later discussions of the correspondence theory of truth, as they examine the relationship between reality and our linguistic capacities. A central problem of his doctrine of substance is how the universal can determine the concrete, whereby he argues that the eidos (form) is immanent in individual things. Analytic philosophy offers alternatives to Aristotle’s concept of substance, including Locke’s substratum theory, which sees substance as an unknowable bearer of properties, and the bundle theory, which states that a thing is merely the sum of its properties. However, these alternatives encounter problems regarding the identity of things with identical properties, as illustrated by the example of the “Ship of Theseus.” Heidegger, by contrast, emphasizes that being and beings are inseparable and that language functions only through generalization, which leads to an internal contradiction when the concrete and individual are to be grasped. Aristotle’s concept of truth thus first raises the question of the identity of thought and being. The concept of substance and the question of truth prove to be closely intertwined in this context, insofar as both concepts aim at the foundation of ALL things and at the same time conceptualize the existence of each thing as based on an individual substance that makes it what it is. Aristotle’s concept of substance already shows that every concept of reality (to which we wish to ascribe truth) is the result of a process of judgment that is based on the (not truly verifiable) assumption of the identity of being and thought.