This last chapter develops a novel epistemological approach by identifying the structural underdetermination of all concepts as a fundamental feature of thinking. From general synthesis concepts, their underlying opposites cannot be unambiguously reconstructed; the path from unity back to its poles remains inherently open. Synthesis concepts contain more than the mere sum of their originating concepts—and it is precisely this “excess” that renders them underdetermined. This underdetermination is not interpreted as a deficiency but as an indication of a previously unarticulated foundation. Analogous to true yet unprovable propositions within formal systems, synthesis concepts presuppose an implicit ground that enables their validity without being derivable from them. Thought therefore does not create new content ex nihilo; rather, it discloses a shared dimension already operative within opposing concepts. The decisive step of this approach consists in systematically explicating this implicit ground and designating it as a distinct epistemological principle: metadoxy. This term refers to the pre-conceptual element that is always presupposed in thinking but can never be fully captured conceptually. Metadoxy is neither a new Absolute nor an ontological substance, nor does it replace traditional metaphysical foundations. Instead, it functions as the condition of possibility for concepts to aim at “reality” at all. The central claim is that concepts do not directly refer to an extra-conceptual reality, but rather to a pre-conceptual ideal of reality implicitly carried within thought itself. This ideal is not encountered as knowledge but as a feeling of indeterminate certainty. Such certainty cannot justify itself; it is the silent presupposition underlying every act of justification. Consequently, classical epistemological distinctions shift: the conditions for accepting a claim as true and the conditions for constituting knowledge (justification) do not coincide but stand in tension with one another. Metadoxy thus introduces a new philosophical perspective. It locates the origin of cognition neither in concepts, nor in empirical data, nor in formal axioms, but in a pre-conceptual relational dynamic between thought and world. This dynamic is neither a mirror nor a bridge to reality, but the structural element through which reality becomes the very aim of thought. The philosophical significance of this approach lies in a radical reconfiguration of the problem of truth. Truth is no longer conceived as simple correspondence between concept and world, but as a movement within a system that remains fundamentally referred to a non-conceptual ground. The ultimate task of the search for truth, therefore, is not the elimination of doubt or the perfection of justification, but the clarification of the metadoxical structure of thought itself—of that pre-conceptual dimension which sustains our concepts, exceeds them, and at the same time grants them their claim to reality.

The Concept of Metadoxy

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发表日期：

2026年

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Tino Schmidt,
Matthias Schmidt

摘要

This last chapter develops a novel epistemological approach by identifying the structural underdetermination of all concepts as a fundamental feature of thinking. From general synthesis concepts, their underlying opposites cannot be unambiguously reconstructed; the path from unity back to its poles remains inherently open. Synthesis concepts contain more than the mere sum of their originating concepts—and it is precisely this “excess” that renders them underdetermined. This underdetermination is not interpreted as a deficiency but as an indication of a previously unarticulated foundation. Analogous to true yet unprovable propositions within formal systems, synthesis concepts presuppose an implicit ground that enables their validity without being derivable from them. Thought therefore does not create new content ex nihilo; rather, it discloses a shared dimension already operative within opposing concepts. The decisive step of this approach consists in systematically explicating this implicit ground and designating it as a distinct epistemological principle: metadoxy. This term refers to the pre-conceptual element that is always presupposed in thinking but can never be fully captured conceptually. Metadoxy is neither a new Absolute nor an ontological substance, nor does it replace traditional metaphysical foundations. Instead, it functions as the condition of possibility for concepts to aim at “reality” at all. The central claim is that concepts do not directly refer to an extra-conceptual reality, but rather to a pre-conceptual ideal of reality implicitly carried within thought itself. This ideal is not encountered as knowledge but as a feeling of indeterminate certainty. Such certainty cannot justify itself; it is the silent presupposition underlying every act of justification. Consequently, classical epistemological distinctions shift: the conditions for accepting a claim as true and the conditions for constituting knowledge (justification) do not coincide but stand in tension with one another. Metadoxy thus introduces a new philosophical perspective. It locates the origin of cognition neither in concepts, nor in empirical data, nor in formal axioms, but in a pre-conceptual relational dynamic between thought and world. This dynamic is neither a mirror nor a bridge to reality, but the structural element through which reality becomes the very aim of thought. The philosophical significance of this approach lies in a radical reconfiguration of the problem of truth. Truth is no longer conceived as simple correspondence between concept and world, but as a movement within a system that remains fundamentally referred to a non-conceptual ground. The ultimate task of the search for truth, therefore, is not the elimination of doubt or the perfection of justification, but the clarification of the metadoxical structure of thought itself—of that pre-conceptual dimension which sustains our concepts, exceeds them, and at the same time grants them their claim to reality.