The coherence theory of truth states that a proposition is true if it can be incorporated without contradiction into a coherent system of statements. In this respect, it is argued that coherence is actually a consistency theory of truth, since a system of statements can only be considered true if it is consistent. However, this alone is also problematic, as freedom from contradiction is not a positive criterion for truth, but only a negative one. Truth is determined by consistency within a system of statements, which means that truth can be independent of the specific content of the statements. Therefore, truth cannot simply be equated with freedom from contradiction, even though a system of contradictory statements cannot be considered true. In philosophy, there are different views on the coherence theory. Some idealists, such as Hegel, regard the coherence of thought as the substance of our knowledge. Others, like Bradley, emphasize that it is not the coherence within a system that grounds its truth, but the coherence with external reality. Joachim and other critics of the correspondence theory point out that truth claims often rest on mental states that have no direct relation to reality. Rescher expands the coherence theory by connecting it with the correspondence theory and emphasizing “ideal coherence,” which aims for a congruence between the cognitive coherence of our theories and the ontological coherence of reality. He argues that we can determine the truth of statements only by the method of coherence, as it is our only available method for finding truth. Overall, the coherence theory remains a formal criterion of truth without concrete reference to reality, based on the assumption that our cognitive coherence ideally corresponds to the ontological coherence of reality. Coherence thus proves to be a criterion of truth only if it is presupposed both as a criterion for the structure of our understanding and as an ordering structure of reality as a whole.

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Coherence Theory

  • Tino Schmidt,
  • Matthias Schmidt

摘要

The coherence theory of truth states that a proposition is true if it can be incorporated without contradiction into a coherent system of statements. In this respect, it is argued that coherence is actually a consistency theory of truth, since a system of statements can only be considered true if it is consistent. However, this alone is also problematic, as freedom from contradiction is not a positive criterion for truth, but only a negative one. Truth is determined by consistency within a system of statements, which means that truth can be independent of the specific content of the statements. Therefore, truth cannot simply be equated with freedom from contradiction, even though a system of contradictory statements cannot be considered true. In philosophy, there are different views on the coherence theory. Some idealists, such as Hegel, regard the coherence of thought as the substance of our knowledge. Others, like Bradley, emphasize that it is not the coherence within a system that grounds its truth, but the coherence with external reality. Joachim and other critics of the correspondence theory point out that truth claims often rest on mental states that have no direct relation to reality. Rescher expands the coherence theory by connecting it with the correspondence theory and emphasizing “ideal coherence,” which aims for a congruence between the cognitive coherence of our theories and the ontological coherence of reality. He argues that we can determine the truth of statements only by the method of coherence, as it is our only available method for finding truth. Overall, the coherence theory remains a formal criterion of truth without concrete reference to reality, based on the assumption that our cognitive coherence ideally corresponds to the ontological coherence of reality. Coherence thus proves to be a criterion of truth only if it is presupposed both as a criterion for the structure of our understanding and as an ordering structure of reality as a whole.