Kant no longer addresses the correspondence between external reality and subjective cognition, but rather the relationship of inner sense to the representations of the understanding. Kant replaces the problem of the correspondence theory—that is, the relationship between the external world and knowledge—with the relationship between self-consciousness and object-consciousness. Since the I is the bearer of all contents of consciousness, Kant relocates the object of knowledge into the realm of subjectivity. This raises the question of whether Kant can still be regarded as a “milestone” of the correspondence theory if the basis of his insights lies more in the unconscious processes of imagination and the unity of the self than in things themselves. Although Kant assumes that our sensory impressions are based on the influence of the “thing in itself,” his epistemology could also do without this assumption. However, without the assumption of a reality as a “thing in itself,” all our knowledge would be merely the product of our understanding and cognitive faculties. The agreement between object and representation becomes a “translation” of objects AS representations. It would be incorrect to say that object and representation can “correspond” to each other, since they are of different natures. Rather, we assign the objects of our world of representations to the “thing in itself.” This translation occurs by relating both to time, which is the form of all our intuitions. Niklas Luhmann observes that Kant shifts the problem of correspondence between object and representation from a dimension of content to a dimension of time. In this way, Kant attempts to solve the problem of the relationship between the external world and knowledge within the subject itself—in the relationship of inner sense to the representations of the understanding. This shows that the assumption of the “thing in itself” is necessary for Kant to be able to speak of an epistemology. However, this assumption remains paradoxical, since Kant’s critical epistemology suggests that the existence of a reality independent of our consciousness can never be proven. Kant argues that it is the “transcendental truth” of our pure concepts of the understanding that provides the precondition for being able to regard empirical judgments as true at all. We require the certainty that the patterns and connections our understanding recognizes in the world are actually given. At the same time, we need the certainty that it is the very facts to be known that dictate to our understanding how it should properly connect them. From the fact that our understanding thinks in regularities, it cannot be concluded that the regularity of nature is a fact. Our thinking does not allow us to assume that the structures we recognize in the world do not actually exist. At least the principle of causality also claims factual validity. This is the critical point in Kant’s philosophy, since he cannot clearly demonstrate the connection between the structures of our understanding and reality. Kant postulates the existence of a “pure reason” within us, which enables knowledge independently of empirical experience. Thus, all empirical judgments are grounded in synthetic a priori propositions. Our knowledge aims to conform to the validity criteria of our own reason.

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发表日期：

2026年

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Tino Schmidt,
Matthias Schmidt

摘要

Kant no longer addresses the correspondence between external reality and subjective cognition, but rather the relationship of inner sense to the representations of the understanding. Kant replaces the problem of the correspondence theory—that is, the relationship between the external world and knowledge—with the relationship between self-consciousness and object-consciousness. Since the I is the bearer of all contents of consciousness, Kant relocates the object of knowledge into the realm of subjectivity. This raises the question of whether Kant can still be regarded as a “milestone” of the correspondence theory if the basis of his insights lies more in the unconscious processes of imagination and the unity of the self than in things themselves. Although Kant assumes that our sensory impressions are based on the influence of the “thing in itself,” his epistemology could also do without this assumption. However, without the assumption of a reality as a “thing in itself,” all our knowledge would be merely the product of our understanding and cognitive faculties. The agreement between object and representation becomes a “translation” of objects AS representations. It would be incorrect to say that object and representation can “correspond” to each other, since they are of different natures. Rather, we assign the objects of our world of representations to the “thing in itself.” This translation occurs by relating both to time, which is the form of all our intuitions. Niklas Luhmann observes that Kant shifts the problem of correspondence between object and representation from a dimension of content to a dimension of time. In this way, Kant attempts to solve the problem of the relationship between the external world and knowledge within the subject itself—in the relationship of inner sense to the representations of the understanding. This shows that the assumption of the “thing in itself” is necessary for Kant to be able to speak of an epistemology. However, this assumption remains paradoxical, since Kant’s critical epistemology suggests that the existence of a reality independent of our consciousness can never be proven. Kant argues that it is the “transcendental truth” of our pure concepts of the understanding that provides the precondition for being able to regard empirical judgments as true at all. We require the certainty that the patterns and connections our understanding recognizes in the world are actually given. At the same time, we need the certainty that it is the very facts to be known that dictate to our understanding how it should properly connect them. From the fact that our understanding thinks in regularities, it cannot be concluded that the regularity of nature is a fact. Our thinking does not allow us to assume that the structures we recognize in the world do not actually exist. At least the principle of causality also claims factual validity. This is the critical point in Kant’s philosophy, since he cannot clearly demonstrate the connection between the structures of our understanding and reality. Kant postulates the existence of a “pure reason” within us, which enables knowledge independently of empirical experience. Thus, all empirical judgments are grounded in synthetic a priori propositions. Our knowledge aims to conform to the validity criteria of our own reason.