The starting point of this work is the question to what extent knowledge can be objectively justified and to what extent our statements, in their claim to truth, must necessarily presuppose a relation to a world that exists independently of our subjective experience. The overall aim is to show that every theory of truth must, in some way, be based on correspondence-theoretical assumptions (i.e., truth is the agreement of a statement or thought with reality), but that every form of correspondence theory NECESSARILY leads either to internally contradictory systems (especially Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Aristotle, and Popper) or to self-contained doctrines that are, by definition, not falsifiable (Thomas Aquinas, the Stoics, Plato, Wittgenstein, Habermas). Conclusion: Since every theory of truth implicitly contains correspondence-theoretical basic assumptions, every theory of truth accordingly exhibits a gap in its justification. Thus, it is shown which basic assumptions of a theory of truth lead to which theoretical lacunae in its justification. Finally, it is discussed to what extent these problems of justification can be traced back to a common root within our conceptual thinking. It is shown that the concepts we form do not correspond to the non-conceptual aspects of reality, but to a “pre-conceptual something.” In our thinking, we always presuppose that our concepts are images or at least symbolic forms of the reality they represent. But our concepts, from the outset, stand in no relation to any reality. They correspond solely to a pre-conceptual foundation of our conceptual thinking. Conceptions of reality, therefore, are not based on a “negativity” of the conceptual itself, as would be found in the mutually defining determination of thesis and antithesis. Rather, they are based on the creation of a pre-conceptual positive in the process of thinking itself. This pre-conceptual positive is developed by our thinking in its engagement with the negativity of conceptual determination. Our thinking must develop a pre-conceptual positive in order to be able to produce concepts of “something” at all. On this basis, the aim of philosophical thinking is reformulated as the task of deciphering that pre-conceptual element in our thinking which, on the one hand, first opens up the world of conceptual thought to us, but, on the other hand, makes reality conceivable to us ONLY as an idealized conceptual representation. To this end, a new approach is finally presented.

Summary

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发表日期：

2026年

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Tino Schmidt,
Matthias Schmidt

摘要

The starting point of this work is the question to what extent knowledge can be objectively justified and to what extent our statements, in their claim to truth, must necessarily presuppose a relation to a world that exists independently of our subjective experience. The overall aim is to show that every theory of truth must, in some way, be based on correspondence-theoretical assumptions (i.e., truth is the agreement of a statement or thought with reality), but that every form of correspondence theory NECESSARILY leads either to internally contradictory systems (especially Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Aristotle, and Popper) or to self-contained doctrines that are, by definition, not falsifiable (Thomas Aquinas, the Stoics, Plato, Wittgenstein, Habermas). Conclusion: Since every theory of truth implicitly contains correspondence-theoretical basic assumptions, every theory of truth accordingly exhibits a gap in its justification. Thus, it is shown which basic assumptions of a theory of truth lead to which theoretical lacunae in its justification. Finally, it is discussed to what extent these problems of justification can be traced back to a common root within our conceptual thinking. It is shown that the concepts we form do not correspond to the non-conceptual aspects of reality, but to a “pre-conceptual something.” In our thinking, we always presuppose that our concepts are images or at least symbolic forms of the reality they represent. But our concepts, from the outset, stand in no relation to any reality. They correspond solely to a pre-conceptual foundation of our conceptual thinking. Conceptions of reality, therefore, are not based on a “negativity” of the conceptual itself, as would be found in the mutually defining determination of thesis and antithesis. Rather, they are based on the creation of a pre-conceptual positive in the process of thinking itself. This pre-conceptual positive is developed by our thinking in its engagement with the negativity of conceptual determination. Our thinking must develop a pre-conceptual positive in order to be able to produce concepts of “something” at all. On this basis, the aim of philosophical thinking is reformulated as the task of deciphering that pre-conceptual element in our thinking which, on the one hand, first opens up the world of conceptual thought to us, but, on the other hand, makes reality conceivable to us ONLY as an idealized conceptual representation. To this end, a new approach is finally presented.