Within the framework of Tocqueville’s study of democracy, the opinion publique is identified, in reference to the unwritten “laws” of social behaviour in Rousseau (1996, 314), which are “inscribed in the hearts of the citizens”, as the main source of intellectual authority in the egalitarian society. In general, every form of collective identity and, thus, in particular, the existence of a social and political association depends on the development of common beliefs and convictions (croyances) that provide (moral) orientation to the actions of the individual by people adopting them in “trust and without discussion” (DA II, 712). In the aristocratic society, the task of embodying such intellectual authority primarily fell to religion (see Chap. 87 ), but under the conditions of equality, the weights shifted in favour of public opinion. The reason for this is that equality makes it difficult or even impossible to subordinate oneself to the competence and expertise of other people or even an authority outside the cognitive ability of humanity. Therefore, as the (perceived) differences between citizens level out, respect for individual citizens or a superior class declines, while in the age of equality, “the disposition to believe the mass” increases inexorably. This ultimately leads to the population generally distrusting individual opinions, whereas it practically excludes the possibility that the majority of citizens could be wrong in their views (DA II, 718 ff.). The intellectual regime of “public opinion” is thus prefigured.