Tocqueville’s original theory of revolution (see Chap. 97 ), which he develops on basis of his intensive study of the conditions in the Ancien Régime on the eve of the events of 1789, has a rather simple basic thesis: The danger of a political uprising increases significantly if the government has previously initiated reforms that already make a turn for the better foreseeable, but the actual revolutionary aspect of the situation is still not able to defuse, but often even provoke it. In other words, revolutions break out in case of doubt and against Marx‘s view, not when the reprisals and perceived injustices are greatest, but as soon as the worst omissions have already been mitigated (Elster 2011, xv). This precarious and hitherto widely overlooked connection between the increased risk of a revolution and effective but belatedly introduced reforms, Tocqueville discusses in the third book of his work L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution (1856). Here, a psychological phenomenon is identified, which in today’s social science is commonly known as the “Tocqueville Effect” (Mendras/Forsé 1983, 130; Coenen-Huther 1997, 96 ff.; Hidalgo 2006, 184 ff.; Elster 2009, 162). Its standard interpretation states that as a result of the onset of improvement, the desires and demands of the population grow faster than the capacities to satisfy them. Despite the absolute improvement in the overall situation, the relative frustration of the citizens increases (Boudon 1982, 105 ff.; Mackie 1995; Swedberg 2009, 260) according to the well-known motto: ‘Give them an inch, and they’ll take a mile’ or ‘The appetite comes with eating’. An alternative but complementary interpretation of the effet Tocqueville assumes that while the desires of individuals remain constant, the improved situation ultimately causes even greater dissatisfaction because the number of those who can hope to benefit from the sweeping reforms increases (Elster 1993, 137, note 2). In both cases, it is a (social-)psychologically plausible phenomenon that an “evil” that was formerly endured patiently as “inevitable“, suddenly becomes ”unbearable as soon as one conceives the idea of removing it. Every abuse that is then eliminated seems to highlight those that remain, and makes them feel more biting; the evil has decreased, it is true, but the sensitivity to it is greater” (OR, 222). A third explanation of the nexus observed by Tocqueville states that the danger of revolution increases in a phase of reforms since the citizens can express their interests and concerns with less danger to life and limb than during a phase of extreme oppression (Oberschall 1995, 155 ff.). This explanatory approach also behaves complementary to the other two interpretations when examined closely.

Tocqueville Effect

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发表日期：

2026年

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Oliver Hidalgo

摘要

Tocqueville’s original theory of revolution (see Chap. 97 ), which he develops on basis of his intensive study of the conditions in the Ancien Régime on the eve of the events of 1789, has a rather simple basic thesis: The danger of a political uprising increases significantly if the government has previously initiated reforms that already make a turn for the better foreseeable, but the actual revolutionary aspect of the situation is still not able to defuse, but often even provoke it. In other words, revolutions break out in case of doubt and against Marx‘s view, not when the reprisals and perceived injustices are greatest, but as soon as the worst omissions have already been mitigated (Elster 2011, xv). This precarious and hitherto widely overlooked connection between the increased risk of a revolution and effective but belatedly introduced reforms, Tocqueville discusses in the third book of his work L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution (1856). Here, a psychological phenomenon is identified, which in today’s social science is commonly known as the “Tocqueville Effect” (Mendras/Forsé 1983, 130; Coenen-Huther 1997, 96 ff.; Hidalgo 2006, 184 ff.; Elster 2009, 162). Its standard interpretation states that as a result of the onset of improvement, the desires and demands of the population grow faster than the capacities to satisfy them. Despite the absolute improvement in the overall situation, the relative frustration of the citizens increases (Boudon 1982, 105 ff.; Mackie 1995; Swedberg 2009, 260) according to the well-known motto: ‘Give them an inch, and they’ll take a mile’ or ‘The appetite comes with eating’. An alternative but complementary interpretation of the effet Tocqueville assumes that while the desires of individuals remain constant, the improved situation ultimately causes even greater dissatisfaction because the number of those who can hope to benefit from the sweeping reforms increases (Elster 1993, 137, note 2). In both cases, it is a (social-)psychologically plausible phenomenon that an “evil” that was formerly endured patiently as “inevitable“, suddenly becomes ”unbearable as soon as one conceives the idea of removing it. Every abuse that is then eliminated seems to highlight those that remain, and makes them feel more biting; the evil has decreased, it is true, but the sensitivity to it is greater” (OR, 222). A third explanation of the nexus observed by Tocqueville states that the danger of revolution increases in a phase of reforms since the citizens can express their interests and concerns with less danger to life and limb than during a phase of extreme oppression (Oberschall 1995, 155 ff.). This explanatory approach also behaves complementary to the other two interpretations when examined closely.