Rational Supererogationism resolves the Paradox of Supererogation through rational reasons why some morally valuable actions should reasonably not be considered duties despite their moral value. According to Rational Antisupererogationism, always the action must be done that is supported by the strongest moral reasons (see Sect. 7.1). Because self-interests are not weighted as moral reasons, there can’t be supererogations. To avoid this conclusion, Supererogationism of Self-Interests assigns moral weight to self-interests (see Sect. 7.2). According to Supererogationism of Non-Moral Reasons, there may be non-moral (i.g. prudential) rational reasons to want an action not to be duty but supererogation (see Sect. 7.3). The Supererogationism of Non-Binding Reasons speaks of supererogations when a morally worthy action is done for moral reasons that are not binding in a strict sense (see Sect. 7.4). At the end of this chapter, I will advocate for a Strong Rationalist Supererogationism with a Virtue-Ethical Outlook (see Sect. 7.5.5). This view holds that supererogations are actions that despite their moral value cannot reasonably be wanted moral duties for two kinds of rational reasons (see Chap. 9), whereby there additionally are virtue-ethical reasons why it is rational to perform them voluntarily (see Sect. 12.4).