For Virtue-Ethical Supererogationism, supererogations are suitable means for the development of moral talents or moral character traits. Therefore, it assumes a duty to supererogate for moral perfection, even though human moral actors can never be morally perfect (see Sect. 6.1). Strict Virtue-Ethical Supererogationism asserts an aretaic duty to develop selected moral talents through supererogatory actions. Because this is equivalent to a duty to at least perform those supererogations that align with one’s own moral talents, this position reformulates the Paradox of Supererogation by asserting a duty to specific supererogations (see Sect. 6.2). The Supererogationism of the Exceptional Persons holds that supererogators are extraordinary people with outstanding moral capacities. Therefore, they have to do actions that the so called “ordinary people” cannot do. This solution to the overburdening problem of supererogations thus comes only at the cost of two kinds of morals actors and of dividing morality in a way that abandons the universality claim of morality (see Sect. 6.4). The Virtue-Ethical Supererogationism of Free Choice holds that supererogations must be voluntary because there can be no duty to develop certain personality traits and thus no aretaic duty to develop moral talents. This groundbreaking supererogationism still lack reliable criteria for distinguishing between supererogations and duties (see Sect. 6.3). This problem, however, can be solved (see Chapt. 9).

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Virtue Ethics and Talents

  • Marie-Luise Raters

摘要

For Virtue-Ethical Supererogationism, supererogations are suitable means for the development of moral talents or moral character traits. Therefore, it assumes a duty to supererogate for moral perfection, even though human moral actors can never be morally perfect (see Sect. 6.1). Strict Virtue-Ethical Supererogationism asserts an aretaic duty to develop selected moral talents through supererogatory actions. Because this is equivalent to a duty to at least perform those supererogations that align with one’s own moral talents, this position reformulates the Paradox of Supererogation by asserting a duty to specific supererogations (see Sect. 6.2). The Supererogationism of the Exceptional Persons holds that supererogators are extraordinary people with outstanding moral capacities. Therefore, they have to do actions that the so called “ordinary people” cannot do. This solution to the overburdening problem of supererogations thus comes only at the cost of two kinds of morals actors and of dividing morality in a way that abandons the universality claim of morality (see Sect. 6.4). The Virtue-Ethical Supererogationism of Free Choice holds that supererogations must be voluntary because there can be no duty to develop certain personality traits and thus no aretaic duty to develop moral talents. This groundbreaking supererogationism still lack reliable criteria for distinguishing between supererogations and duties (see Sect. 6.3). This problem, however, can be solved (see Chapt. 9).