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The spectrum of negative judgments as they might apply to various attempts of contextualizing the natural sciences philosophically and socially is large and difficult to parse. Comparisons between Kant’s strong negation of the idea that matter could ever penetrate itself on the one hand and the personally abrasive style of physicist Richard Feynman’s direct communication with regard to errors made by himself and others on the other hand are drawn in order to assess the usefulness of articulating negative judgments for scientific practice and its philosophical evaluation. While several levels of such negative judgments yield results of varying epistemic quality, the importance of the ability to say „no“ to an idea in the strongest terms as an instrument of knowledge-generation is vehemently affirmed.

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Wie die Naturwissenschaft Nein sagt. Oder: Warum schimpft Richard Feynman?

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Dietmar Dath

摘要

The spectrum of negative judgments as they might apply to various attempts of contextualizing the natural sciences philosophically and socially is large and difficult to parse. Comparisons between Kant’s strong negation of the idea that matter could ever penetrate itself on the one hand and the personally abrasive style of physicist Richard Feynman’s direct communication with regard to errors made by himself and others on the other hand are drawn in order to assess the usefulness of articulating negative judgments for scientific practice and its philosophical evaluation. While several levels of such negative judgments yield results of varying epistemic quality, the importance of the ability to say „no“ to an idea in the strongest terms as an instrument of knowledge-generation is vehemently affirmed.