This chapter takes the recent ‘post truth’ threat to democratic politics as an occasion to revisit John Dewey’s view of the public as a political actor that is both indispensable for the project of modern democracy and vulnerable to self-effacement. Drawing on a fairly new development in democratic theory—epistemic democracy—that is in part inspired by Dewey, it tracks how Dewey’s relativist understanding of truth animates his views of the public as a political actor and of democracy as a “collective exercise in practical intelligence” (Festenstein). In linking the epistemic thrust of Dewey’s political theory with his view of communication as art, it moves beyond established understandings of epistemic democracy to argue that the aesthetic is assigned with a key role in collectively exercising the practical intelligence that both sustains democracy and moves it forward—and that epistemic democrats have overlooked so far.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

What Dewey Knew (and Habermas Didn’t): The Public as Problem, Practice, and Art

  • Laura Bieger

摘要

This chapter takes the recent ‘post truth’ threat to democratic politics as an occasion to revisit John Dewey’s view of the public as a political actor that is both indispensable for the project of modern democracy and vulnerable to self-effacement. Drawing on a fairly new development in democratic theory—epistemic democracy—that is in part inspired by Dewey, it tracks how Dewey’s relativist understanding of truth animates his views of the public as a political actor and of democracy as a “collective exercise in practical intelligence” (Festenstein). In linking the epistemic thrust of Dewey’s political theory with his view of communication as art, it moves beyond established understandings of epistemic democracy to argue that the aesthetic is assigned with a key role in collectively exercising the practical intelligence that both sustains democracy and moves it forward—and that epistemic democrats have overlooked so far.