The guiding principle of phenomenology, founded in the twentieth century by Edmund Husserl, was ‘back to the things themselves’ (Husserl LI1, p. 168/Hua XIX/1, p. 10). This was felt as a real liberation within philosophy after the age of German Idealism (epitomized by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel), in which the knowing subject, reason, or absolute spirit were central. Finally, the world and things, as well as experience, could again take center stage instead of a critique of knowledge (epistemology), dialectics, or metaphysical speculation. As Husserl emphasizes in the preface to the second edition of the Logical Investigations (1900 first edition, 1913 second edition), one must not rely on already established concepts, theories, or methods, but must return to the “immediately envisaged and seized things themselves”, leaving the “last word to these things themselves and to one’s work upon such things” (LI1, p. 4/Hua XVIII, p. 9). Against any metaphysical speculation, but also against the view of philosophy as mere analysis of concepts, a plea is made here for a return to, and revaluation of, intuition (sense experience): “Away with the hollow word analyses. We must question the things themselves. Back to experience, to intuition, which alone can give sense and reasonable right to our words” (Hua XXV, p. 21, automatic translation, edited).