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In this essay will be firstly offered various reasons for advocating a classical approach to Kierkegaard’s authorship, according to which this “is religious from first to last”. In this sense one should consider his purported stages of existence as being ranked. Secondly it will be argued for the rationality of the transition between these competing interpretations of existence. A challenge (offered by Alasdair MacIntyre) against this classical view on transition will be firstly presented – according to whom we should understand Kierkegaard’s intention (from Either-Or) as that of presenting the reader with an ultimate choice between an aesthetical and an ethical stage of existence: in this respect the Danish thinker did not commend one option over the other. It will then be shown Marilyn Piety’s and Gordon Marino’s replies to this assertion: for Piety the aforementioned “ultimate choice” interpretation is possible only when a person has a dispassionate stance toward her existence; however, she offers evidence that for the Dane in reality “passion” permeates one’s reason in such cases. For Marino, Kierkegaard’s rationality of transition is in similar terms understood to those of the “theory choice” model of scientific rationality. MacIntyre’s response to these rebuttals will also be shown: in his view, although some passions are for the Dane essential in transition, the ones suggested by both authors are not continuous between the stages. Against this idea Stephen Evans’ reply will be imported, which states that there are – according to Kierkegaard – some ethical leanings which are present even in the aesthetic stage and that the ethicist’s problem is not firstly one of ignorance, but rather one of the unwillingness to commit himself to what he already knows. Moreover, Evans argues that Kierkegaard can be considered an externalist epistemologist, for whom knowledge is a matter of being rightly related to the external world; for the Dane our ability for so relating partly depends on the qualities we possess as human beings. It will finally be argued that such a view is similar to that proposed by Michael Polanyi in his philosophy of science.

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Kierkegaard and the Rationality of Transition between Competing Frameworks of Existence

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Valentin Teodorescu

摘要

In this essay will be firstly offered various reasons for advocating a classical approach to Kierkegaard’s authorship, according to which this “is religious from first to last”. In this sense one should consider his purported stages of existence as being ranked. Secondly it will be argued for the rationality of the transition between these competing interpretations of existence. A challenge (offered by Alasdair MacIntyre) against this classical view on transition will be firstly presented – according to whom we should understand Kierkegaard’s intention (from Either-Or) as that of presenting the reader with an ultimate choice between an aesthetical and an ethical stage of existence: in this respect the Danish thinker did not commend one option over the other. It will then be shown Marilyn Piety’s and Gordon Marino’s replies to this assertion: for Piety the aforementioned “ultimate choice” interpretation is possible only when a person has a dispassionate stance toward her existence; however, she offers evidence that for the Dane in reality “passion” permeates one’s reason in such cases. For Marino, Kierkegaard’s rationality of transition is in similar terms understood to those of the “theory choice” model of scientific rationality. MacIntyre’s response to these rebuttals will also be shown: in his view, although some passions are for the Dane essential in transition, the ones suggested by both authors are not continuous between the stages. Against this idea Stephen Evans’ reply will be imported, which states that there are – according to Kierkegaard – some ethical leanings which are present even in the aesthetic stage and that the ethicist’s problem is not firstly one of ignorance, but rather one of the unwillingness to commit himself to what he already knows. Moreover, Evans argues that Kierkegaard can be considered an externalist epistemologist, for whom knowledge is a matter of being rightly related to the external world; for the Dane our ability for so relating partly depends on the qualities we possess as human beings. It will finally be argued that such a view is similar to that proposed by Michael Polanyi in his philosophy of science.