Kierkegaard on Miracles
摘要
This article argues that Kierkegaard subscribes to a view of belief formation very much like Hume’s in that, like Hume, Kierkegaard thinks we tend to form beliefs based on the uniformity of repeated experience. But while Hume concluded that this meant belief in miracles was inherently irrational in that miracles were by definition anomalous experiences, Kierkegaard has a more complex view of belief formation than Hume, a view that allows for belief in such anomalous experiences to be rational. That is, this article argues that “reason” (Fornuft) is not synonymous, according to Kierkegaard, with rationality (Fostaaelse), in that reason appears antithetical to the appreciation of the epistemological significance of the relative qualitative differences in experiences. Belief formation, for Kierkegaard, is not based entirely on the quantity of experiences of a certain sort, but also on their quality. Kierkegaard thus appears to reject Hume’s view that belief in miracles “subverts all the principles of [a person’s] understanding,” but appears to agree with Hume that such belief is “contrary to custom” and to much human experience and that hence it needs repeatedly to be renewed through “a continued miracle.”