Justice is a peculiar fundamental value: It  is widely regarded as important but when it comes to concretely determining what is just and what is unjust, opinions diverge widely. While in antiquity and the Middle Ages justice was still seen as closely linked to actions in an ordered community, the idea is transferred to interpersonal relationships in modern times (such as in the concept of exchange justice). Soon two irreconcilable positions face each other: the radical-libertarian position, for which freedom always takes precedence over justice, and the socialist-egalitarian view, in which the reverse thesis applies. A compromise between the two is Rawls’ liberal theory of justice, which, however, also cannot really specify what is to be regarded as just and unjust. As an alternative, sociological thesis, experiences of injustice are introduced here: They bring the objective structures of social inequality to social consciousness and lead to varying forms of criticism of social conditions up to revolutions. The direct conclusion from objective structures to their justice or injustice is problematic, as shown by the example of Marx theory and its influence on the labor movement. Experiences of injustice were the leitmotif in the efforts to solve the social question and they also represent important determinants of personal behavior and social processes in small groups. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the extent to which representative democracy embodies the political fundamental values of freedom, equality, and justice. A number of deficits and new problems are named (media concentration, unequal weight of different associations, inadequate opportunities for participation). Finally, arguments are put forward that speak for opportunities for democratization of today’s authoritarian systems.