This chapter takes a closer look at so-called categorical objections to human germline gene editing. Categorical objections played an important part in some of the earlier debate and has informed some of the legal and regulatory frameworks on germline gene editing. The chapter explores different categorical objections as well as various objections to these. Are there convincing reasons to presume that germline gene editing interventions violates fundamental moral norms? The chapter explores different versions of such arguments based on deontological concepts such as human dignity, individual and collective rights, autonomy, and informal consent. Could germline gene editing, if adopted on broad scale, lead to disastrous outcomes such as eugenics, injustice, and loss of values? Is there a risk for an unavoidable slippery slope? Or is there something inherently wrong in the use of this technology (such as “humans playing God”)? The chapter concludes that these kinds of objections fail to make a convincing case that it is categorically wrong to edit the human germline. They nevertheless highlight ethical concerns that need to be taken seriously.