In this chapter, three types of basic philosophical approaches to moral analyses are outlined to provide context and analytical tools for the subsequent analysis of and discussion about the arguments for or against human germline editing. According to the first approach, moral rightness is determined by the value of the consequences (value maximization). In the second approach, it is not only the consequences that determine the moral rightness of an action, but moral boundaries, principles, and norms that regulate what is permissible or not (moral permissibility). The third approach is about the pursuit of ideals, which deals with arguments about the desirability of various futures and to what extent our actions prevent or enable such futures. The chapter argues that even though these approaches are typically associated with specific moral theories they can be understood as distinct modes of reasoning in their own right. The chapter argues that when it comes to addressing the ethics of new and potentially disruptive technologies it becomes more important to include also the kinds of moral considerations raised by third kind of approach.

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Moral Theory and Moral Reasons

  • Madeleine Hayenhjelm,
  • Christer Nordlund

摘要

In this chapter, three types of basic philosophical approaches to moral analyses are outlined to provide context and analytical tools for the subsequent analysis of and discussion about the arguments for or against human germline editing. According to the first approach, moral rightness is determined by the value of the consequences (value maximization). In the second approach, it is not only the consequences that determine the moral rightness of an action, but moral boundaries, principles, and norms that regulate what is permissible or not (moral permissibility). The third approach is about the pursuit of ideals, which deals with arguments about the desirability of various futures and to what extent our actions prevent or enable such futures. The chapter argues that even though these approaches are typically associated with specific moral theories they can be understood as distinct modes of reasoning in their own right. The chapter argues that when it comes to addressing the ethics of new and potentially disruptive technologies it becomes more important to include also the kinds of moral considerations raised by third kind of approach.