Structural Injustice, Fair Equality of Opportunity and the Basic Structure

This chapter addresses a criticism of John Rawls stating that his theory cannot adequately address structural forms of injustice implicated in inequality of opportunity. It argues that Rawls’s can indeed theorize several of these types of structural injustice. First, it can preclude structural class injustice, including inequality of opportunity between socio-economic classes caused by economic structures. Second, it can address injustice in the division of labor through the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Third it can perhaps address injustice in the internal structure of private corporations, sanctioning democratic forms of organization that increase people’s opportunities to hold jobs with decision-making responsibility. It cannot, however, address nondemocratically organized religious institutions, as that would conflict with its commitment to freedom of conscience. Fourth, it can, on one interpretation, rely on the principle of fair equality of opportunity to indirectly oppose unjust social standards that diminish the opportunities of members of certain groups by portraying them as inferior.