Logical Abductivism and the Liar Paradox
摘要
Logical abductivism is a specific version of an anti-exceptionalist view in the philosophy of logic. According to logical abductivism, logical theories are justified, assessed or revised via scientific methods of rational theory choice. The paper proposes four criteria that typically guide an abductive cost-benefit analysis when comparing rival logics. These criteria are non-triviality, adequacy with evidence or data, appropriate balance between strength and simplicity, and intertheoretic coherence. They will be used as a guideline to examine, in particular, Timothy Williamson’s argument that even in light of the semantic paradoxes, classical logic is abductively preferable to its non-classical alternatives, such as the logics \(\text {K}_{3}\) and LP. Against Williamson’s view, it is contended that scientific reasoning does not universally and categorically employ the rules of classical logic. Moreover, many classical solutions to the Liar paradox are burdened with abductive costs. It is also argued that the concern, according to which non-classical gap- or glut-theories of truth would have an unfavorable effect on epistemology, is unjustified. In the last part of the paper, an operator account of truth is suggested and abductively compared to predicate theories of truth.