An objective description of nature depends on the faculties of the human mind, since any such representation, which in fact proves to be many distinct representations, must always relate to how we experience the world. Moreover, science cannot explain how and why human experiences have the qualitative nature they have. In addition, there are other features ascribed to human beings in the manifest image, like humans’ sense of becoming and free will, but not accounted for in the scientific image. In the present chapter, the mental side of human beings has evolved, and is constantly evolving, because of the changing cultural contexts in which we live. Our brain is adapted to processing cultural as well as physical information to guide our behavior. The study of the human mind consists of finding possible correlations between brain patterns and mental reports. But such correlations do not tell us why they exist in the first place. Here I draw on an earlier work of mine, How Matter Becomes Conscious, arguing that the qualitative properties we ascribed to physical things are derived from how these things are mentally presented to human beings. The same holds for thoughts about cultural and social phenomena the knowledge of which we acquire using language. In particular, the evolution of language from warning signs to its modern sophistication would be inexplicable if the content expressed by any such language did not have a decisive effect on the brain’s ability to generate mental states and behavior. My conclusion is that mental states of any form should be regarded as extrinsic properties of the brain. They occur when the brain sensory interacts with everything inside and outside our body. Consciousness is therefore a manifestation of the dispositions of the brain’s intrinsic properties to produce mental states during its perceptual and behavioral interaction with the environment. Thus, where intrinsic properties of a system exist independently of its relation to other systems, extrinsic properties are properties that a system has because its interaction with other systems regardless of whether these systems are natural or social. I also argue that extrinsic properties are something we already find in other areas of science. Assuming such a suggestion to be true allows the introduction of human experiences into a general understanding of reality.