If only the absolute is true, where, then, does the relation lie? Moreover, what is meant by such a concept? Ordinarily, ‘relation’ means a mono-dyadic construct, i.e., one consisting of two extreme terms and a middle term connecting them. The theoretical issue is whether relations have an extrinsic character, i.e., they are between things, or whether they have an intrinsic and constitutive value of the things themselves. Plato first dwelt on the concept of relation, understanding it as metaxy, and highlighted the definitely problematic logical structure of the relation thus understood. Aristotle spoke of the “aporia of the third man”. In our opinion, rather than an aporia, the relation, understood as a construct, configures an antilogy, so that it has to be understood as the act of self-referring, rather than as a status: that is, as the fact of having referred itself. It is thus intrinsic to the datum and counts as the referring of each to another datum, given the insufficiency of the datum itself.