This chapter analyzes the General Theory of Law from a discursive approach, emphasizing the importance of the reciprocal contribution between the Semiotics of Law and the General Theory of Law. The metascientific legal language is analyzed as a component of the discourse of the General Theory of Law. In this interpellation, the text dialogues intensely with the contributions of Algirdas Julien Greimas, Peter Goodrich, Dominique Maingueneau, Maria Giulia Dondero and Jerzy Wroblewski. Throughout its analysis, the chapter is dedicated to understanding the relationship between the General Theory and the Special Theories, which have emerged in contemporary context, and which, gradually, are taking over the place of the General Theories of Specialities of the Science of Law. This point is placed at the center of the analysis, insofar as what is observed is that the scientific universe in the field of Law is expanding, which has implied an increase in the branching of new fields of the Science of Law. In this context of transformations, it is debated whether the General Theory of Law is outdated and has lost its discursive place, in the face of the multiplication of the General Theories of Specialities. In fact, there is a repositioning, which needs to be analyzed and exposed, of the General Theory of Law as a federative science of specialized legal knowledge. With this, the reflexive force and the resolutive force begin to coordinate more harmoniously, in the process of adapting the General Theory of Law to current challenges. This Chapter is also dedicated to understanding the specific discursive nature of the scientific enunciation of the General Theory of Law, descending toward an exhaustive study of its specific qualities, which are: i.) universal statements; ii.) abstract statements; iii.) empirical-analytical statements; iv.) theoretical statements; v.) rational and demonstrative statements; vi.) complex statements; vii.) unifying statements; viii.) general statements; ix.) polemic statements; and x.) argumentative statements. In the context of the rise of algorithmic rationality, the process of dehumanization of the Science of Law is discussed and the figure of the jurist-Prometheus is also discussed. Finally, this chapter also discusses the role of a Theory of Humanistic Realism within the framework of General Theory of Law, and its critical task of preparing legal professionals for humanization and the exercise of reflective power, at a time when the rationality inherent in the Science of Law is being eroded.