The implementation of effective revocation mechanisms for Verifiable Credentials (VCs) within Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) ecosystems presents a persistent challenge, primarily due to the inherent trade-offs between user privacy preservation, system scalability, and operational efficiency. Conventional approaches, including CRLs and OCSP, frequently compromise user anonymity by inadvertently leaking usage metadata. Conversely, while contemporary privacy-centric solutions leveraging Zero-Knowledge Proofs (e.g., ZK-SNARKs) effectively enforce strong unlinkability, they incur considerable computational latency and prohibitive verification costs, limiting their practicality for high-frequency credential validation. Furthermore, recent adaptations of Anonymous Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (AHIBE), despite offering theoretical flexibility, are practically constrained by the linear complexity associated with update operations. This paper presents SCOR-AHIBE, a hybrid architecture that integrates AHIBE with a minimal on-chain registry to offload cryptographic operations off-chain. This design resolves the scalability limitations of prior AHIBE schemes by implementing a constant-time O(1) smart contract registry. Empirical benchmarks demonstrate superior economic efficiency compared to ZK-SNARKs, achieving gas-free verification and sub-second delegation latency while maintaining revocation publication and status update costs at approximately 160,000 and 33,000 gas, respectively. In addition, leveraging the BLS12-381 curve enables a dynamic credential lifecycle, including un-revocation, with negligible cryptographic overhead. By uniting strong privacy guarantees with high operational performance, the architecture provides a scalable foundation for next-generation decentralized identity management.

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SCOR-AHIBE: A Scalable Constant-Time Revocation Scheme for Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Credentials

  • Quoc Khanh Huynh,
  • Nhat Nguyen Nguyen,
  • Tuan-Dung Tran

摘要

The implementation of effective revocation mechanisms for Verifiable Credentials (VCs) within Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) ecosystems presents a persistent challenge, primarily due to the inherent trade-offs between user privacy preservation, system scalability, and operational efficiency. Conventional approaches, including CRLs and OCSP, frequently compromise user anonymity by inadvertently leaking usage metadata. Conversely, while contemporary privacy-centric solutions leveraging Zero-Knowledge Proofs (e.g., ZK-SNARKs) effectively enforce strong unlinkability, they incur considerable computational latency and prohibitive verification costs, limiting their practicality for high-frequency credential validation. Furthermore, recent adaptations of Anonymous Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (AHIBE), despite offering theoretical flexibility, are practically constrained by the linear complexity associated with update operations. This paper presents SCOR-AHIBE, a hybrid architecture that integrates AHIBE with a minimal on-chain registry to offload cryptographic operations off-chain. This design resolves the scalability limitations of prior AHIBE schemes by implementing a constant-time O(1) smart contract registry. Empirical benchmarks demonstrate superior economic efficiency compared to ZK-SNARKs, achieving gas-free verification and sub-second delegation latency while maintaining revocation publication and status update costs at approximately 160,000 and 33,000 gas, respectively. In addition, leveraging the BLS12-381 curve enables a dynamic credential lifecycle, including un-revocation, with negligible cryptographic overhead. By uniting strong privacy guarantees with high operational performance, the architecture provides a scalable foundation for next-generation decentralized identity management.