The Body and the Technosphere: Beyond Phenomenology and Its Conceptual Matrix
摘要
In the history of metaphysics and its transformation by Heidegger, the body cannot have emerged as an explicit issue, as it still hides today in neuro-cognitivism under the notion of an “incarnation of consciousness.” It could not be mentioned separately, in its principal autonomy, because it had the status and feature of a small object with its corresponding features of matter and form (eidos and morphé). Considering the horizons of the intersubjectivity of consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty made the first and last step in the growth of metaphysics in terms of its way to the existential turn and openness of the body as an event. What has been recognized in the onto-pathology of the world as a marvelous disinfection of disharmony from the kingdom of the “phantom hand” is the discovery of the technological assemblage of human possibilities of an existence in the world.