This chapter examines the 2023 banking crisis, focusing specific on the case of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Credit Suisse (CS). The analysis focuses on the features of these crises pertaining to debt governance, testing the theoretical contribution of this book. In so doing, this chapter analyses how and why key mechanisms intended to foster market discipline and bank resolvability, including contingent convertible bonds (CoCos), underperformed under stress. The analysis reveals that while both banks faced idiosyncratic vulnerabilities, the system is still vulnerable to runs and resolution lacks credibility. This chapter highlights that the (lack of) effective debt governance deepens these vulnerabilities. This chapter shows that the mere existence of ex-ante regulatory and contractual tools are not sufficient to discipline banks unless embedded within a credible institutional framework favouring timely enforcement. Specifically, in the SVB case, the de facto bailout of uninsured depositors disrupted expectations of loss-sharing, while in the CS case, the wipeout of AT1 bonds revealed critical flaws in their contractual design. Across both cases, supervisory reluctance to act timely, prompting bank recovery, contributed disorderly resolution. Rather than discrediting the logic underpinning the need for effective debt governance in banking, these crises confirmed its validity: it can function only when supported by a credible resolution framework and institutional commitment to act timely. In turn, the lack of effective debt governance reduces the effectiveness of the resolution framework, triggering a vicious circle where bailout still appears as the only available option.