This chapter analyses the composition of bail-inable debtholders and the relevance of counterparty identities in resolution. The core insight of the EU resolution regime for distressed banks is that losses should be allocated to insiders—the bail-inable creditors. Nevertheless, both regulators and academics have overlooked the importance of identifying actual investors in bail-inable securities—i.e., who is going to bear losses. This chapter explains, theoretically and empirically, why and how the shape and magnitude of counterparty risk is crucial for the credibility and effectiveness of the resolution regime. This chapter highlights the relevant trade-offs and provides informative data on bail-inable security holders. It highlights that the market is adjusting towards a desirable composition of holders even though considerable room for improvement is still available, and a mix of different investors might yield superior outcomes. This exercise deepens the current understanding of the impact of the resolution framework on market preferences, providing evidence on both the credibility of the resolution framework and the perspectives of effective application of the new tools. Finally, this chapter discusses some possible ways forward, underlining the importance of increasing the share of sophisticated investors that are specialised in dealing with bail-inable securities, especially for junior positions. It proposes a balanced mix of investors with different business models and time horizons so as to minimise systemic risk while maximising governance benefits. This chapter concludes that to incentivise market players to shift toward a more efficient composition, granting ex-ante governance rights is warranted.