Karl Popper’s three-worlds theory 1 (Niemann, 2019; Karl R. Popper, 1982, 1996, 2002; Karl R. Popper & Eccles, 1984) has been made available for spatial and landscape research in various ways (including: Hard, 2002; Koegst, 2022; Kühne, 2018c, 2020; Kühne & Berr, 2021; Kühne & Jenal, 2020c; Schafranek et al., 2006; A.-M. Weber et al., 2024; Weichhart, 1999; Werlen, 1986, 1997; Zierhofer, 1999), however—against the backdrop of poststructuralist approaches—it was limited to a niche existence (Kühne, 2023). The theory of the three worlds allows abstract access to spatial ideas and concepts without their contents having to be specified. Against the background of our book’s neopragmatist orientation, the three-worlds theory and the resulting deductions of the theory of the three spaces or landscapes function as a quasi-ontological analytical tool. Quasi-ontological because, as explained above, ‘truth’ in neopragmatism is limited to a vocabulary and cannot be related to its environment, and an analytical tool because the theory creates a categorization system with the help of which complexity, complication, and contingency can be organized to such an extent that relationships become comprehensible. This quasi-ontological analytical tool has proven itself in various studies, both in terms of theoretical considerations and empirical approaches (including: Hinz et al., 2024; Kühne & Jenal, 2020a, 2020b; Kühne & Koegst, 2023; Kühne et al., 2024b). In this chapter, we build on the most comprehensive differentiation of the theory of three spaces or landscapes to date (Kühne et al., 2025). Building on this, we take a further step toward a theory that considers not only intersubjectivity but also sociality. In doing so, we expand the theory of space and landscape into a theory of society.