Once a distinction between intuition and reflection is stipulated, it remains to understand their interactions and functions in moral reasoning. Dual-process theories, conceiving reasoning as a serial interplay between two types of thinking, one intuitive and the other reflective, can offer important insights into this question. This chapter examines dual-process models of moral reasoning, focusing on the relationship between moral intuition and reflection. After outlining the domain-general dual-process framework (Sect. 4.1), Greene’s influential dual-process model is discussed (Sect. 4.2). According to this view, intuition favors deontological judgments, while reflection promotes consequentialist judgments. However, this model faces notable empirical and conceptual challenges. To address these, I propose a dual-process reflective equilibrium model (Sect. 4.3). In this account, moral intuitions detect dyadic harm and help and trigger reflection when a problem presents conflicting or unclear dyads. On the other hand, moral reflection rationalizes intuitions to provide articulated and accessible reasons. Individual rationalization can, in turn, enhance social communication and cooperation among reasoners (Sect. 4.4).