The Strength of Intuitions: A Metacognitive Account
摘要
Beyond their automaticity, moral intuitions emerge in consciousness with a distinct sense of credibility and compellingness. This chapter examines this psychological feature, referred to as intuitive strength. Section 2.1 introduces the main characteristics of intuitive strength, setting the stage for a metacognitive account, described at length in Sect. 2.2. In this view, the strength of moral intuitions denotes the level of subjective confidence in a given moral categorization. This sense of confidence is a metacognitive feeling, that is, an automatic and affective appraisal of the fluency with which the moral information is processed. Drawing on relevant evidence, the chapter highlights the cognitive function of feelings of confidence and uncertainty in guiding the acceptance of moral beliefs and the allocation of cognitive resources. Section 2.3 explores the factors shaping metacognitive feelings, focusing on the influence of moral emotions, contextual variables, and individual differences. Lastly, Sect. 2.4 addresses the parallels and distinctions between intuitive strength and the vividness of sensory perceptions—a comparison often proposed in philosophical literature.