‘Moral Machines’?
摘要
This chapter tries to establish whether it is possible—and preferable—to create ‘moral machines.’ First, it describes the advantages and drawbacks typically associated with ‘moral machines,’ and, then, it introduces Aristotle’s notion of and conditions for morality. Also, a summary of the ontological analysis of AI machines carried out in Chap. 3 is cited, as it seems fitting to determine whether they can indeed be moral. The conclusion is that the ontological condition of artifacts prevents machines from having the internal capabilities required to act with an end in sight, and, therefore, they cannot act morally. They lack a conscience, free will, and sentience, and, thus, it is impossible for moral machines to exist. However, as AI agents’ actions actually have moral consequences, we must provide the means to keep them from doing harm. Alas, given the nature of ethics, the last word must be human. AI alone should not make final decisions, because its very nature prevents it from factoring in all the circumstances that moral appraisals take into account.