Unsolicited network traffic observed to the addresses monitored by a network telescope enables, among other things, tracking of Internet outages, botnets and DDoS attacks. We examine how a decrease in available address space affects what we can learn about the phenomena we study with telescopes. We conduct a targeted replication of a seminal study conducted 10  years ago. Since then, IPv4 scarcity and rising operational costs have placed increased pressure on operators to maximize use of their allocated space, which has resulted in a reduction of address space available to major telescopes. As a first step, we characterize traffic to three network telescopes that differ in size, spatial distribution, and prominence. We find that most address blocks within each telescope observe a similar number of source IP addresses, and that smaller telescopes offer higher visibility per monitored address. We also find that sources target the IPv4 address space pervasively, with 37.0% of them targeting a /16 block in each of the three telescopes within an hour. As a case study, we examine the sensitivity of randomly-spoofed DoS attack inference to the size of the address space under observation and find that larger telescopes detect many attacks missed by smaller ones, although smaller telescopes observe disproportionately many relative to their address space size. Our study provides a framework to quantify the effects of reduced telescope address space and outlines future directions for telescope research.