The aim of this chapter is to show that an overarching definition of cause can be constructed, at least in a deterministic setting. Several well-known accounts, notably the counterfactual, manipulationist, and functional accounts can be unified. The functional interpretation is generally accepted in the physics community, but is unfortunately largely absent from contemporary analytic investigations—yet it is essential for understanding the ontology of the universe. The greatest tool for unification will appear to be the ‘representation-relativity of causal identification’ (this is a relativity not of causation as such, which is best understood as an objective feature of the world, embedded in the laws of nature). This perspectival relativity is akin to the one encountered when investigating Gettier’s problem. On the basis of this epistemological principle I will propose a modified counterfactual account, and show that it solves a remarkably wide array of problems. Finally, I will argue that there are good reasons to believe that this model, perhaps with minor modifications, can englobe probabilistic causation.