This chapter discusses the possibility of transplants from US class action model to EU model of collective redress. Microcomparison between the US class action and the EU model of collective redress shows differences in litigation Funding funding and contingency fees, cost shifting rules are completely different in the US and cannot be compared to the regulations in EU Member States. A macrocomparison shows that US adversarial legalism with private enforcement and regulation through litigation doctrines are quite different when compared to European preference for public enforcement. The fundamentally different approach between the US and Europe may suggest that EU collective redress does not have the same significance as the US class action. A restrictive approach to collective or ideological parties, no rules on certification, a preference for opt-in, a restrictive approach to contingency fees and the application of the loser pays principle are said to be typical for Europe. Three insufficient or lacunary elements in EU collective redress are identified where US class actions experience might be transplanted (designation of qualified Entities, absence of public funding for qualified entities i.e. public law litigation funds for qualified entities and criteria for treatment of outstanding redress funds that were not recovered).

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Are Transplants Possible in EU Models of Collective Redress

  • Jorg Sladič

摘要

This chapter discusses the possibility of transplants from US class action model to EU model of collective redress. Microcomparison between the US class action and the EU model of collective redress shows differences in litigation Funding funding and contingency fees, cost shifting rules are completely different in the US and cannot be compared to the regulations in EU Member States. A macrocomparison shows that US adversarial legalism with private enforcement and regulation through litigation doctrines are quite different when compared to European preference for public enforcement. The fundamentally different approach between the US and Europe may suggest that EU collective redress does not have the same significance as the US class action. A restrictive approach to collective or ideological parties, no rules on certification, a preference for opt-in, a restrictive approach to contingency fees and the application of the loser pays principle are said to be typical for Europe. Three insufficient or lacunary elements in EU collective redress are identified where US class actions experience might be transplanted (designation of qualified Entities, absence of public funding for qualified entities i.e. public law litigation funds for qualified entities and criteria for treatment of outstanding redress funds that were not recovered).