Our paper aims to take stock of the influence of the thought of the philosopher Edmund Husserl on the early work of his disciple Edith Stein to find out how close she came to (or how far she departed from) the central aspects of the phenomenological method within the framework of the transcendental turn in phenomenology that took place almost immediately after the publication of the Logical Investigations in 1900–1901, but which reached the general public in 1913 with the publication of the first volume of the Ideas. Our thesis is that Stein understood Husserl’s phenomenology beyond the limit imposed by the closed pre-phenomenological concepts of idealism and realism. Both authors agreed in affirming that the autonomy of reality does not annul the notion of “donation of meaning” which explains, rather, how subjectivity can access it within the limit of experience. To achieve our purpose, we will analyze Stein’s Einführung in die Philosophie (Introduction to Philosophy) in line with the fundamental concepts of Husserl’s thought that appear critically analyzed in the text. We will divide our work into three parts: first, an analysis of idealism; second, the explanation of nature as a philosophical problem; finally, third, an analysis of subjectivity and the sciences proper to it.