Corporate governance plays a critical role in shaping firm performance, especially in emerging markets where regulatory systems are still evolving. This study develops an econometric modeling approach to examine how governance structures—such as board independence, ownership concentration, investor protection, and disclosure quality—affect financial outcomes. Using a mixed-methods design, the analysis combines quantitative financial data with qualitative insights from governance frameworks. Regression equations and structural models were employed to link governance indicators with key performance metrics, including Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, and measures of agency costs. Results show that firms with more independent boards and stronger shareholder protections achieve higher ROE and ROA, while disclosure quality and investor protection significantly improve market valuation. Governance reforms, such as the creation of independent board committees, were also found to reduce agency costs compared to traditional structures. By integrating socio-legal context with data-driven econometric analysis, the study provides practical insights for policymakers, regulators, and corporate leaders seeking to strengthen governance systems, enhance transparency, and promote sustainable growth in emerging economies.

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Econometric and Computational Modeling of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Emerging Markets

  • Saif Saad Ahmed,
  • Ibrahim Khilel Khinger,
  • Deena Waleed Hameed Jawad,
  • Majid Fadhil Ziboon,
  • Akram Fadhel Mahdi,
  • Danylo Bohatyrov

摘要

Corporate governance plays a critical role in shaping firm performance, especially in emerging markets where regulatory systems are still evolving. This study develops an econometric modeling approach to examine how governance structures—such as board independence, ownership concentration, investor protection, and disclosure quality—affect financial outcomes. Using a mixed-methods design, the analysis combines quantitative financial data with qualitative insights from governance frameworks. Regression equations and structural models were employed to link governance indicators with key performance metrics, including Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, and measures of agency costs. Results show that firms with more independent boards and stronger shareholder protections achieve higher ROE and ROA, while disclosure quality and investor protection significantly improve market valuation. Governance reforms, such as the creation of independent board committees, were also found to reduce agency costs compared to traditional structures. By integrating socio-legal context with data-driven econometric analysis, the study provides practical insights for policymakers, regulators, and corporate leaders seeking to strengthen governance systems, enhance transparency, and promote sustainable growth in emerging economies.