We are facing a threat brought by future Cryptographic Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQC): Store Now and Decrypt Later (SNDL). Our public key algorithms based on discrete logarithms and large number factorization are vulnerable to the Shor quantum algorithm. Symmetric cryptography is not facing such a threat since incrementing the key length is still a working countermeasure. Many different countries like Korea, USA, China, Russia, Spain, France, Germany and others in the European Union, have elaborated recommendations and plans to transition to quantum resistant public key algorithms, many of them proposing new lattice and hash based cryptography. The plans include the need for extensive experimentation with the foreseen algorithms under many different network conditions and applications. A group of four public universities in the Community of Madrid supported by a regional funded project, RAMONES-CM, is promoting an action called MadPQC for setting up a testing centre, which allows running pilots and execution of different tests and implementation of Post Quatum Cryptography (PQC). Not only the new cryptographic algorithms proposed in the NIST competition, those standardised in 2024, but they can be subsequently extended to others including the expected candidates to the new competition promoted from China and announced at the ETSI/PQC last june 2025, the Korean proposals, etc. The action will make it possible to verify other experiments already carried out, validate the use of the new algorithms and offer implementation methodologies for the transition to our industrial companies and administrations. In this paper we explain the plans and schedule of MadPQC experimentation. We present an example of MadPQC initial results using DTLS 1.3, which has not been so tested as TLS 1.3, and present our initial proposals of methodologies for the transition.