A Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol is proposed, combining features of BBM92 and SARG04 to enhance resistance against Photon-Number Splitting (PNS) attacks while maintaining the advantages of entanglement-based systems. The protocol employs a symmetric structure in which both participants independently measure entangled qubits using randomly chosen bases and publicly announce compatible non-orthogonal two-state bases. This strategy enables partial inference of measurement results by the other participant, forming the basis for the final shared key, while undetected eavesdropping becomes statistically improbable. A proof-of-concept implementation of the proposed protocol has been developed using Qiskit, enabling the simulation of both ideal conditions and various interception attacks. These simulations confirm the protocol’s practical security, demonstrating its ability to detect eavesdropping and preserve key integrity under realistic adversarial scenarios. The proposed method is particularly suitable for deployment in high-security network environments such as healthcare systems, power stations, smart grids, or critical national services, where secure communication is essential and where resilience against advanced quantum-level attacks is required.