This chapter links Kant’s theory of judgment to Fichte’s account of perception and recognition. Fichte argues that the Kantian moral law presupposes, but cannot determine who falls within its scope—whether only humans or also nonhumans possess moral status. To address this gap, he shifts attention from abstract law to embodied encounter, arguing that the body’s expressions demand recognition as those of a moral being. This embodied view of judgment requires a corresponding theory of perception. Fichte’s notion of “subtle matter” mediates between the sensible and the intelligible in communication, showing how perception carries normative force. Perception is at once active and receptive: creatively formative yet open to the bodily expressions of the other. Crucially, such expressions surface where judgment falters, as a body resists being confined within fixed teleological roles. This opens a line that Fichte only gestures toward but does not pursue, which the chapter develops by extending his theory of perception to interpret the bodily expressions of nonhuman beings as potential bearers of recognition claims. It concludes by contrasting the Fichtean with the more familiar Hegelian paradigm of recognition, highlighting its distinctive advantages and implications for environmental ethics.